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Abstract
We consider the possibility of designing an election method that
eliminates the incentives for a voter to rank any other candidate equal
to or ahead of his or her sincere favorite. We refer to these meth-
ods as satisfying the “Strong Favorite Betrayal Criterion” (SFBC).
Methods satisfying our strategic criteria can be classified into four
categories, according to their geometrical properties. We prove that
two categories of methods are highly restricted and closely related to
positional methods (point systems) that give equal points to a voter’s
first and second choices. The third category is tightly restricted, but
if criteria are relaxed slightly a variety of interesting methods can
be identified. Finally, we show that methods in the fourth category
are largely irrelevant to public elections. Interestingly, most of these
methods for satisfying the SFBC do so only “weakly,” in that these
methods make no meaningful distinction between the first and second
place on the ballot. However, when we relax our conditions and al-
low (but do not require) equal rankings for first place, a wider range
of voting methods are possible, and these methods do indeed make
meaningful distinctions between first and second place.
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1 Introduction
This is a draft. I would appreciate feedback. Public discus-
sion of this draft can be undertaken at http://votingmath.blogspot.com.
Voting theorists have known since the work of Gibbard and Sat-
terthwaite that voting systems using ranked ballots will give incentives
for insincere voting[1, 2]. Nonetheless, many people defend various
voting reform proposals (e.g. Instant Runoff Voting) by claiming that
their proposal will solve the “lesser of two evils” problem, and allow
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voters to support their sincere favorite candidate [3, 4]. It is easy to
show that this claim is false for Instant Runoff Voting, as there will
still be cases in which voters have an incentive to insincerely rank a
“lesser evil” in first place. Still, the claims are common, suggesting
that there is public interest in the design of voting methods that elim-
inate the incentive to list a “lesser evil” in first place. It is therefore
worth exploring the extent to which incentives for manipulation can be
reduced, with particular attention to incentives regarding first place
rankings. We can analyze this by considering whether voting meth-
ods satisfy a criterion called the “Favorite Betrayal Criterion” (FBC),
which relates to the incentives voters face when deciding which can-
didate to list in first place [5, 6]. The FBC can be stated as:
Definition 1 A voting method satisfies the Favorite Betrayal Cri-
terion (FBC) if there do not exist situations where a voter is only able
to obtain a more preferred outcome (i.e. the election of a candidate
that he or she prefers to the current winner) by insincerely listing an-
other candidate ahead of his or her sincere favorite.
A variety of methods are known to satisfy this statement of the
FBC[5, 6]. One well-known example is Approval Voting[7]. However,
most of these methods satisfy the FBC by allowing a voter to rank
one or more candidates equal to his or her sincere favorite. This is,
in some sense, a “weak” way of protecting one’s favorite candidate.
We will instead explore a stronger version of the FBC, in which it is
further stipulated that a voter never has an incentive to rank another
candidate equal to his or her favorite:
Definition 2 A voting method satisfies the Strong Favorite Be-
trayal Criterion (SFBC) if there do not exist situations where a
voter is only able to obtain a more preferred outcome (i.e. the elec-
tion of a candidate that he or she prefers to the current winner) by
insincerely listing another candidate ahead of or equal to his or her
sincere favorite.
Note that neither definition requires that there never be situations
in which a more preferred outcome can be obtained by insincerely vot-
ing another candidate ahead of one’s favorite. Such situations can still
exist with an FBC-compliant method. However, the voter should be
able to do at least as well by indicating some other insincere ordering
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that leaves his or her favorite(s) at the top of the list while insincerely
changing the relative rankings of the other candidates.
To make this concrete, consider a simple example of a method
that satisfies FBC and SFBC: antiplurality voting. In this method,
voters rank the candidates on their ballots, each candidate receives one
point for each ballot on which he or she is not ranked last, and the
candidate with the most points wins. A voter has no disincentive to
rank his or her sincere favorite in first place, so it complies with SFBC.
However, it is still a manipulable method, in accordance with the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, since a voter may have an incentive
to insincerely rank some other candidate in last place, if there is a
close race between that candidate and the voter’s favorite.
Also, antiplurality voting illustrates our point about the possibil-
ity of obtaining a more preferred outcome either by demoting one’s
favorite OR by indicating some other ranking that leaves one’s fa-
vorite candidate(s) at the top of the list. For instance, suppose that
in an antiplurality election with 4 candidates the top contenders are
a voter’s second and third choices. (Call these respective candidates
c2 and c3, for convenience.) That voter has a clear strategic incentive
to insincerely rank c3 in last place. Which candidate he or she ranks
in first place on his or her ballot is irrelevant, as all candidates except
c3 will receive one point each. In this case, ranking c2 in first place
will have the same effect as ranking c2 in second place and leaving
his or her sincere favorite (called c1 for convenience) in first place, as
long as c3 is ranked last. Similar SFBC-compliant methods can be
designed in which the first and second choices each receive one point,
and candidates ranked lower receive specified fractions of a point.
Note, however, that antiplurality voting only “weakly” satisfies
the intent of the SFBC, since the first place designation given to the
favorite is purely ceremonial. There is no practical distinction between
ranking a candidate in first place or second place. Still, while there
is no difference between first and second place for determining the
outcome, there might be political or social significance attached to
the first place votes, e.g. as a measure of party strength.
The issue that we address here is whether other SFBC-compliant
methods exist, and the nature of such voting methods. We will use
geometric techniques to show that SFBC-compliant methods can be
classified into 4 categories. Two of the categories are highly restricted
and have some features similar to anti-plurality voting. A third cate-
gory is heavily restricted, but if the SFBC condition is relaxed to FBC
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it includes a variety of recently-proposed methods [5, 6]. We will show
that the fourth category is largely irrelevant to public elections.
Finally, before beginning our formal analysis, a note on voter in-
centives: One could argue that our analysis is irrelevant because indi-
viduals have almost no incentive to vote insincerely if elections decided
by a single vote are rare. A trivial response is that almost no incen-
tive is not the same as no incentive. Our more serious response is
that in practice one can consider strategic choices facing campaigners
and activists seeking to influence voters. Should they advise a faction
of voters with similar preferences to vote sincerely or strategically?
If enough voters heed the advice of a campaigner, especially when
using a complicated ranked method that makes strategic incentives
opaque to the non-expert, then the decisions of an individual per-
forming strategic calculations can indeed influence the course of an
election.
2 Ballot Design
Voting theorists have proposed a wide range of election methods using
a wide range of ballot types. Here we restrict our attention to methods
which can be conducted with ballots on which each voter assings a rank
to each candidate, and no other information is indicated on the ballot
for the purpose of determining the election outcome. We make no
assumptions about whether more than one candidate can be assigned
the same rank, or whether a voter can leave some ranks unused. For
instance, one could imagine a method in which a candidate receives 5
points if assigned the first rank, 4 points if assigned the second rank, 3
points if assigned the third rank, and so on down to the sixth rank (for
which a candidate receives zero points). In this method, a voter might
assign a favorite candidate the first rank, a compromise candidate the
second rank, and all remaining candidates in the last rank (or not list
the remaining candidates, formally equivalent to listing them in the
sixth rank). A rank has still been assigned to every candidate, even if
some ranks were not used and other ranks were used multiple times.
Likewise, we do not exclude from consideration methods in which
the number of ranks is less than the number of candidates. For in-
stance, in Approval Voting every candidate is either approved or dis-
approved (equivalent to ranking every candidate in either the first or
the second slot on a ballot) and the winner is the candidate ranked
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“approved” on the greatest number of ballots[7]. As another example,
in the “plurality” or “first past the post” elections commonly used
in the United States, only one candidate receives a vote, implicitly
equivalent to a first rank, and all of the other candidates are implic-
itly ranked in the second position.
3 Criteria
For the sake of simplicity, we impose several criteria on the election
methods under consideration.
1. Anonymity: The outcome doesn’t depend upon which voter sub-
mits which ballot, but only on how many voters cast ballots of
each type. Formally, the outcome is function of {nk}, where nk
is the number of voters submitting ballots that indicate a given
preference order Pk.
2. Neutrality: All candidates are treated equally, so that the level
of support required for victory is the same for all candidates.
Formally, if every voter changes his or her ballot in such a way
that the winning candidate c1 is swapped with a candidate c2
(while all other preferences are left unchanged), then c2 should
win. Conversely, if every voter changes his or her ballot in such
a way that the winning candidate c1 retains the same ranking
but losing candidates c2 and c3 are swapped (while all other
preferences are left unchanged), then c1 should still win.
3. No Turnout Quota: The number of voters participating in an
election is irrelevant to the result. Only the fraction of the elec-
torate casting ballots of a particular type is relevant.
4. Linearity: The conditions for a candidate to win can be expressed
by a series simple inequalities that are linear in the tallies of the
ballot types. Formally, the inequalities that must be satisfied for
candidate ci to win involve conditions of the form:
∑
k
uijk · nk > 0 (1)
where {uijk} are constant coefficients (some of which may be
negative), i refers to the candidate, j indexes the condition being
checked, and k indexes the preference orders.
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Note that because of the No Turnout Quota criterion the right
hand sides of the inequalities can be set to zero without loss of
generality: Suppose the right hand side of an inequality were
some constant α. Because the numbers of voters with each pref-
erence order will sum to nV (the total number of voters), we can
write the righthand side as α · (
∑
k nk) /nV , and then rewrite the
inequality as
∑
k uijk ·nk−α·nk/nV =
∑
k (uijk − α/nV )·nk > 0.
With a suitable redefinition of the coefficients, we can write the
inequality with a zero on the righthand side.
5. Decisiveness: There is always a single winning candidate, except
in the case of ties. Formally, a necessary condition for a tie
is that at least one of the expressions being evaluated (i.e. an
expression of the form
∑
k uijk ·nk) to determine the outcome is
equal to zero.
Our Anonymity and Neutrality criteria are violated in some no-
table cases. For instance, American Presidential elections violate our
formulation of the Anonymity criterion, since additional supporters
only help a candidate if those supporters live in states that the can-
didate needs to win. Also, a recall election might be considered in
violation of Neutrality if, for instance, an incumbent with 49.9% sup-
port is removed for lacking a majority, and succeeded by somebody
who wins 35% support in a 3-way race. Nonetheless, the Anonymity
and Neutrality criteria are satisfied in most public elections held in
democratic societies. We impose them in this work to gain consider-
able simplicity without undue loss of generality.
The Linearity criterion, while not always explicitly discussed, is
satisfied in every seriously proposed election method that we are aware
of. Still, one could invent hypothetical election methods utilizing in-
equalities that are nonlinear in ballot tallies, so we must impose Lin-
earity explicitly. Fortunately, it is a very weak criterion: In our anal-
ysis we will examine criteria satisfied by boundaries and their normal
vectors. We expect that if one wanted to analyze nonlinear methods,
most of the results would carry over because they impose constraints
on the orientation of boundaries.
The No Turnout Quota criterion eliminates from our analysis any
election rules in which the result depends on the absolute number of
ballots cast, e.g. elections in which a quorum of eligible citizens must
support a result for it to be valid. In such situations, abstention may
become a viable strategy for voters, a complication that we neglect
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here. Due to our Decisiveness criterion, the only elections without
a valid winner will be elections that end in ties, and the set of tied
elections will be of lower dimension than the set of possible elections
(since a linear expression must be exactly equal to zero for a tie to
occur).
4 Outline
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we
will outline the geometrical formalism that we use to describe election
methods. Our formalism is closely related to that used by Saari[8],
representing the set of ballots cast as a point in the unit simplex. In
this formalism, an election method partitions the simplex into regions,
each region corresponding to victory by a particular candidate. The
components of the normal vectors to the boundaries are related to
the coefficients {uijk} introduced in our definition of the Linearity
criterion. Using reasoning similar to Saari’s proof of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem, we will show that the boundaries between
these regions determine the strategic incentives confronting a voter.
We will then derive requirements that each boundary (and its normal
vector) must satisfy in order for a method to comply with the SFBC.
Based on the geometric properties of the boundaries, we will clas-
sify SFBC-compliant election methods into 4 distinct categories. The
most important result in this work concerns methods in which each
boundary satisfies a different. These methods correspond to certain
positional methods (elections in which a candidate receive points ac-
cording to the number of voters assigning him each rank). In the
second category, some of the boundaries satisfy multiple conditions,
and we will prove that methods in this category can be thought of
as a hybrid of runoffs and positional methods, akin to the Bucklin
method[9]. In the third category, all of the boundaries satisfy multi-
ple conditions, and we will give examples of methods in this category.
Finally, in the fourth category every boundary satisfies every possi-
ble condition, and we will argue that methods in this category are
uninteresting for public elections.
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5 Formalism
5.1 Vector Notation for Electorates
Because of our Anonymity criterion, the outcome of the election can
be determined if we know the number of voters indicating each prefer-
ence order Pi. In addition, as discussed above, our No Voter Turnout
Quota criterion implies that the total number of voters nV participat-
ing is irrelevant to the election outcome. It then follows that a listing
of the fraction of voters indicating each preference order P contains
sufficient information to specify the election outcome. We will there-
fore follow the lead of Saari and describe the electorate with what
Saari refers to as a normalized profile vector p, where each compo-
nent pk = nk/nV indicates the fraction of the voters who cast a ballot
indicating a preference Pk. (This definition for the components also
defines the basis that we will use for working in this vector space.)
The dimensionality d of the space that these vectors reside in de-
pends on the number of candidates nc and whether we allow voters
to cast ballots where some candidates are ranked equal. In the case
where equal rankings are disallowed (recall that the Strong FBC rules
out the need for ballots listing multiple candidates in first place), the
dimensionality of the space is nc!.
In any case, profile vectors will lie in the unit simplex Si(d), defined
as the set of all vectors in d-dimensional space such that all of their
components (in our chosen basis) are non-negative and add up to
unity. It is convenient to express this summation of components to
unity as a condition on the inner product (p, I) =
∑
k pk · 1:
(p, I) = 1 (2)
where I is a vector for which all of the components are 1. The vector
I is significant in this work in part because the relation (p, I) = 1
enables us to simplify certain results, and also because I/d lies at a
symmetry point (the center of the simplex).
We can also formulate our victory conditions in terms of inner
products, and re-write Eq. (1) as:
∑
k
uijk · nk =
∑
k
uijk · pk · nV = (p,uij) · nV > 0 (3)
where uij is a vector of coefficients defining the jth condition for can-
didate ci to win. Because nV > 0, Eq. (3) can just as easily be written
as (p,uij) > 0.
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5.2 Boundaries
An election method can be considered as a procedure for dividing the
simplex into nc regions, each region corresponding to the election of
one of the nc candidates. Geometrically, we can say that an election
method specifies the boundaries between regions and assigns a winner
to each of the nc regions. In this view, the Neutrality criterion specifies
the symmetry of the boundaries.
Consider the boundary between a region where candidate ci wins
and a region where candidate cj wins. Mathematically, this boundary
can be specified piecewise in terms of its normal vector Nij. The vec-
tor Nij points outward from the boundary and into the region where
candidate ci wins, while −Nij points outward from the boundary and
into the region where cj wins. A basic fact of analytical geometry is
that all of the points in a flat surface will have the same projection
onto the normal vector. In our formalism, this means that (p,Nij)
is constant along the boundary. We can set the constant to whatever
value we like and still have a geometrically valid definition of a bound-
ary. However, in keeping with Eq. (3) we will assume that the inner
product is zero, along a boundary, i.e.
(p,Nij) = 0 (4)
The choice of zero for the right hand side corresponds to the notion
that boundaries represent tied results, in which case two weighted
ballot counts exactly cancel. Also, there is no loss of generality here,
due to our assumption that (p, I) = 1. Suppose that one wanted to
define boundaries so that (p,Nij) is equal to some constant value a.
We can rewrite our new victory condition (p,Nij) = a as (p,Nij) =
(p, aI), or (p,Nij − aI) = 0, which amounts to a redefinition of the
normal vector in Eq. (4).
Note that because the boundaries may be defined piecewise (giving
rise to kinks or folds in profile space), satisfaction of Eq. (4) may not
be a sufficient condition for a profile to lie on the i− j boundary. The
piecewise specification of the boundaries is the subject of the next
section.
The Neutrality condition imposes certain requirements on the bound-
aries. For instance, suppose a profile vector p lies on the i−j boundary
defined by the normal vector v, i.e. (p,v) = 0 and v points from the
boundary into the region where ci wins. If every voter were to swap
candidates ci and cj on his or her ballot, then the profile vector should
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still be somewhere on the i− j boundary (although perhaps not on a
portion with normal vector v, if the boundary is defined piecewise).
Voters swapping candidates ci and cj on their ballots corresponds to
swapping components of the profile vector p. This is a linear opera-
tion, and so its effect on the profile vector p can be represented by a
matrix Si,j (which we will call a ”symmetry operator”) acting on p.
There should hence be some other normal vector v′ (possibly equal
to −v) that defines some portion of the (possibly piecewise-defined)
i− j boundary such that (Si,jp,v
′) = 0.
It is easy to show that the operator Si,j is unitary or self-adjoint
(in the language of linear algebra), and this enables us to relate the
inner normal vectors v′ and v. The fact that Sij is unitary implies
that:
(Sijp,v
′) = (p, Si,jv
′) = 0 (5)
The condition (p,v) = 0 therefore implies that (p, Si,jv
′) = 0,
and hence v and Si,jv
′ must be linearly dependent, i.e. they must
be proportional to each other by some constant scalar factor. The
magnitude of the factor is irrelevant for our purposes, and whether
it is positive or negative depends on how we define the orientations
of v and v′ relative to the i − j boundary. However, in the special
case where v and v′ are also linearly dependent (i.e. the electorate
obtained by swapping ci and cj on every ballot lies on the same portion
of the piecewise defined boundary) it must be the case that v′ = −v.
In that special case, one of the vectors (v or v′ defines the inner normal
Nij pointing toward the region where ci wins, and the other vector
defines the inner normalNji pointing from the same boundary toward
the region where cj wins.
A similar line of reasoning shows that if a vector v is normal to
some portion of the i − j boundary, then Sj,kv should be normal to
some portion of the i−k boundary. We thus see that as a consequence
of the Neutrality criterion the boundaries between victory regions are
related by symmetry operations involving the exchange of candidate
names.
5.3 Election Methods as Sequential Procedures
Having established the vector notation for defining election methods
according to the vectors normal to boundaries between victory regions,
let us now consider how boundaries might be defined piecewise. Elec-
tion methods can generally be specified as procedure defined by a series
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of if-then-else statements regarding the numbers of voters submitting
different ballot types. For instance, the simple (and SFBC-compliant)
method of antiplurality voting could be formally specified as:
IF The number of voters listing c1 in last place
is less than the number of voters listing c2 in
last place,
AND The number of voters listing c1 in last place
is less than the number of voters listing c3 in
last place,
AND ...
THEN Candidate c1 wins.
ELSE
IF The number of voters listing c2 in last place
is less than the number of voters listing c1 in
last place,
AND The number of voters listing c2 in last place
is less than the number of voters listing c3 in
last place,
AND ...
THEN Candidate c2 wins.
ELSE
etc.
If the con-
ditions are expressed as sets of linear inequalities, we get:
IF (p,u11) > 0
AND (p,u12) > 0
AND ...
THEN Candidate c1 wins.
ELSE
IF (p,u21) > 0
AND (p,u32) > 0
AND ...
THEN Candidate c2 wins.
ELSE
etc.
where the vectors {uij} are chosen so that (p,u11) is (for this partic-
ular example) the difference between the number of last place votes
received by candidate c2 and candidate c1, and so forth.
Notice that in the text description of the voting method the condi-
tions for candidate c2 to win could be obtained by swapping the labels
1 and 2 for the candidates, in accordance with our Neutrality crite-
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rion. If the conditions are translated into sets of linear inequalities,
then (as discussed above) the vectors uij defining those conditions are
related by the symmetry operator S1,2. In general, once we define a
set of sufficient conditions under which some candidate ci wins, we
can invoke Neutrality to define conditions for any other candidate to
win.
We will refer to a set of conditions related by symmetry operations
as a ”stage” of an election method.
Definition 3 Given a set of linear inequalities such that the simulta-
neous satisfaction of those inequalities is a sufficient for a particular
candidate ci to win (and the vectors used to define the associated linear
inequalities), we can generate a stage of victory conditions by apply-
ing swap operators Sj,k to those vectors for all j and k. Cases where
i = j or i = k will produce conditions for some other candidate to
win. Cases where j 6= i and k 6= i will produce alternative conditions
for ci to win.
The popular Instant Runoff method is an example of a method
where a single stage will have multiple conditions for the same can-
didate to win. In Instant Runoff, a candidate can win if he or she
survives successive eliminations to become one of the 2 final candi-
dates considered, and receives majority support over the other finalist.
For that method, there would be multiple scenarios under which the
candidate could win, corresponding to different opponents in the final
round.
Whether a stage of conditions has nc conditions (1 per candidate)
or some multiple of nc (i.e. multiple ways for each candidate to win)
depends on the vectors defining the primary set of inequalities used
to generate the stage. If we have a series of inequalities defining a
sufficient set of conditions for ci to win, and if applying any swap
operator Sj,k (j, k 6= i) to any of the vectors associated with that set
of conditions generates another vector of that set of conditions, then
the only swap operation that changes the set of inequalities is one that
changes the name of the winner, and so there are only nc conditions in
that stage (one per candidate). Otherwise, the number of conditions
in that stage will be a multiple of nc. This fact will prove to be useful
later.
The sets of conditions for different candidates to win in a stage
must be mutually exclusive, so that a stage produces a unique winner.
However, the conditions need not be exhaustive, i.e. a stage could
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select no winner. Numerous election methods can be expressed as
procedures with stages that sometimes yield no winner. For instance,
if a method elects a candidate listed in first place by a majority of the
voters, and uses some alternative procedure when there is no majority
favorite, that method will be one in which the first stage does not al-
ways yield a winner. When that is the case, our Decisiveness criterion
requires that the first stage of the method be augmented by a series of
subsequent stages so that the method yields a unique winner in every
case except ties, which will correspond to a lower-dimensional subset
of the unit simplex that the electorate vectors reside in.
Also, although a stage of victory conditions can be generated by
applying swap operations to a single set of conditions for a particular
candidate to win, it may be that not all of the vectors defining that
primary set of conditions are necessary to specify the election method.
Some of the vectors in that primary set used to generate the stage may
also be related to each other by swap operations. For instance, if a set
of conditions for a candidate to win consists of 5 linear inequalities,
it may be that the vectors defining some of those inequalities can be
derived from each other by swap operations. It will be useful later
on in this work to consider the minimal number of vectors needed to
specify all of the inequalities in a stage of an election method. We
therefore introduce this definition:
Definition 4 A Minimal Set of Generators M for a stage s of
an election method is a set of vectors {vi} such that:
• Every vector defining every inequality in that stage can be ob-
tained from a vector in M by a suitable sequence of swap opera-
tions.
• No vector in M can be obtained from any other vector in M by
any sequence of swap operations.
The number of vectors in M is said to be the number of generators for
s.
Note that the minimal set M for a given stage s is not unique. If the
same swap operator were applied to every vector in M , we would still
have another minimal set of generators for the same stage s.
Finally, it is worth noting that when boundaries are specified piece-
wise the same vector may define different boundaries under different
circumstances. Consider, for instance, 3 candidates in an election
conducted with Instant Runoff. Suppose that no candidate is the first
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choice of a majority but candidate c1 is the first choice of the greatest
number of voters. Suppose also that candidate c1 can defeat candidate
c2 in a one-to-one contest, but he or she cannot defeat c3. A necessary
condition in determining whether c1 or c3 wins is whether c2 has more
first place votes than c3 or fewer first place votes than c3, and so the
vector v used to specify that linear inequality is the vector normal to
a portion of the 1 − 3 boundary. However, if c1 could defeat c3 in a
one-to-one contest but could not defeat c2, then that same vector v
would be normal to a portion of the 1 − 2 boundary. We therefore
see that some of the vectors defining our linear inequalities may be
normal to multiple boundaries, depending on the circumstances.
6 Voter Incentives and Geometry
Whether or not a voter has an incentive to vote insincerely depends
on the boundaries between the victory regions for different candidates.
Suppose, for instance, that the condition for candidate ci to win in-
stead of cj is (p,Nij) > 0 (with the case (p,Nij) > 0 corresponding
to a victory for candidate cj). The inner product (p,Nij) is in essence
a weighted sum over the ballot types of the number of each type of
ballot submitted, with the ballot numbers corresponding to the com-
ponents of the vector p and the weighting factors corresponding to the
components of the normal vector Nij. A voter therefore has an incen-
tive to submit whichever ballot type will receive the greatest weight
(positive or negative, depending on their preference). Voters who pre-
fer ci to cj will want to cast a ballot of a type corresponding to the
largest positive component of Nij, and voters who prefer cj to ci will
want to cast a ballot of a type corresponding to the largest negative
component of Nij.
This line of reasoning was used by Saari in his proof of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem [8], where he showed that the theorem requires
all of the components of the normal vectors to be either the same
positive number of the same negative number. He then went on to
show that election methods corresponding to boundaries defined by
such normal vectors inevitably lead to paradoxes. Here, we will show
that when this line of reasoning is applied to the SFBC we can obtain
somewhat less stringent conditions on the normal vectors.
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6.1 SFBC-Compliant Methods
Consider a voter whose sincere favorite candidate is c1, and who prefers
some candidate ci (i may or may not be equal to 1) to some other
candidate cj (j 6= 1). If the election is a close race between ci and cj ,
then the condition determining the election outcome will be whether
(p,Nij) is positive (ci wins) or negative (cj wins). As argued above,
this voter will want to cast a ballot of a type that corresponds to
the largest component(s) of Nij . In order for the method to comply
with the SFBC, that ballot type must list c1 in first place. A similar
analysis holds for any other voter who prefers ci to cj , and so the
vector Nij must have at least nc−1 elements with the same maximum
(largest positive) value. Of those maximum elements, at least one
must correspond to a preference order listing each of the candidates
other than cj in first place. Otherwise, there will be voters with an
incentive to list some candidate other than their favorite in first place.
A similar analysis shows that the normal vector Nij must have
at least nc − 1 minimum (largest negative) elements, and of those at
least one must correspond to a preference order listing each of the
candidates other than ci in first place. This leads us to our first
significant result:
Theorem 1 If a voting method complies with the SFBC, then any
normal vector being used to define the i− j boundary must satisfy the
following conditions:
1. At least nc−1 components must have the same maximum (largest
positive) value, and for each candidate other than cj there must
be at least one component of Nij corresponding to a preference
order with that candidate in first place.
2. At least nc−1 components must have the same minimum (largest
negative) value, and for each candidate other than ci there must
be at least one component of Nij corresponding to a preference
order with that candidate in first place.
Also, our Neutrality condition implies that the normals to differ-
ent boundaries can be obtained by the application of swap operators,
which would exchange candidates in preference orders and correspond-
ingly swap components of the normals. Moreover, if a vector satisfies
the conditions for Nij in an SFBC-compliant method, then multiply-
ing it by −1 exchanges the maximum (largest positive) and minimum
(largest negative) components. Because the conditions for normals are
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stated in terms of minimum and maximum components, it follows that
multiplying a suitable Nij vector by −1 gives a suitable Nji vector.
Note that the requirements laid out in Theorem 1 are necessary
but not sufficient for a method to satisfy SFBC. It is not enough for a
method to define victory conditions in terms of vectors satisfying the
requirements of the theorem. The conditions must also be arranged in
such an order that non-satisfaction of a condition only leads to certain
results. When an election result changes because an inequality of the
form (p,v) > 0 is no longer satisfied, and when the vector v satisfies
the requirements for the normalN12, the only possible outcome should
be that the election result is now the victory of candidate c2 instead
of c1.
As was remarked above, when boundaries are defined piecewise,
the same vector may define multiple boundaries, depending on the
situation. This does not necessarily pose a problem for the normal
vectors specifying a SFBC-compliant method. A normal vector v
could satisfy the necessary conditions for the normal vectors Nij and
Nik (j 6= k). In that case, for any candidate other than ci there must
be at least one element of v that has the minimum (largest negative)
value and corresponds to a preference order with that candidate in
first place. Also, for any candidate other than cj there must be at
least one element of v that has the maximum (largest positive) value
and corresponds to a preference order with that candidate in first
place, and for any candidate other than ck there must be at least one
element of v that has the maximum (positive) value and corresponds
to a preference order with that candidate in first place. The second
pair of conditions imply that for every candidate there must be at
least one element of v with the maximum (largest positive) value and
corresponding to a preference order with that candidate in first place.
This implies that v satisfies the conditions for any normal vector Nix
(x 6= i) in an SFBC-compliant method. This leads to the following
useful result:
Theorem 2 If a vector v satisfies the necessary conditions for the
normal vectors Nij and Nik (assuming j 6= k) in an SFBC-compliant
method, v satisfies the necessary conditions for any normal vector Nix
(x 6= i) in an SFBC-compliant method.
Analogous reasoning leads to the following result:
Theorem 3 If a vector v satisfies the necessary conditions for the
normal vectors Nji and Nki (j 6= k) in an SFBC-compliant method,
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v satisfies the necessary conditions for any normal vector Nxi (x 6= i)
in an SFBC-compliant method.
Also, the same considerations lead to one more result concerning
normal vectors satisfying multiple conditions:
Theorem 4 If a vector v satisfies the necessary conditions for the
normal vectors Nij and Nkl (i 6= k and j 6= l) in an SFBC-compliant
method, v satisfies the necessary conditions for any normal vector Nxi
(for all admissible values of x and y) in an SFBC-compliant method.
We therefore see that a vector normal to a boundary in an SFBC-
compliant method can fall into 3 categories, defined as follows:
Definition 5 We will refer to 3 different types of normal vectors for
the boundaries between victory regions.
1. A Type 1 vector only satisfies the requirements necessary for
the boundary between 2 particular victory regions.
2. A Type 2 vector satisfies the requirements for all of the bound-
aries to the victory region for a single candidate ci.
3. A Type 3 vector satisfies the requirements for all of the bound-
aries between all of the victory regions defined by this election
method.
Note that while we have given these results in terms of compliance
with SFBC, the theorems given here also apply to FBC-compliant
methods if weakened slightly to include the possibility of ranking two
candidates together in first place.
6.2 Geometric Classification of SFBC-Compliant
Methods
Having considered the requirements that individual normal vectors
must satisfy for an election method to satisfy the SFBC, let us now
consider how we can use these requirements to classify the stages that
comprise an election procedure. Each stage will consist of a series of
linear inequalities defined by vectors that are in turn related to each
other by swap operators. Each vector may satisfy the requirements
for a single boundary (case 1 above), multiple boundaries on the same
region (case 2 above), or all possible boundaries (case 3 above). Given
those possibilities, the following taxonomy will be useful for the results
that follow:
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Definition 6 The stages of an election method compliant with the
SFBC shall be referred to as coming in 4 different types.
1 A stage of an SFBC-compliant election method will be referred to
as a Type 1 stage if each vector defining a victory condition is
of Category 1, i.e. it only satisfies the requirements for a single
boundary in an SFBC-compliant method. So, if a vector defining
a condition for candidate ci to win satisfies the requirements for
the normal vector Nij it will not satisfy the requirements for the
normal vector Nik (k 6= j).
1b A stage of an SFBC-compliant election method will be referred
to as a Type 1b stage if some of the vectors satisfy a single
condition (as in Type 1 stages) and other vectors are of category
2, i.e. they satisfy requirements for multiple boundaries of the
same region (i.e. some vectors are of Category 2, i.e. they
satisfy the requirements for Nij and Nik) in an SFBC-compliant
method.
2 A stage of an SFBC-compliant election method will be referred to
as a Type 2 stage if all of the vectors defining a condition for a
candidate to win are of Category 2, i.e. they satisfy the require-
ments for multiple boundaries of the same region. For these types
of stages, any vector defining a condition for candidate ci to win
will satisfy the requirements for Nij and Nik (for all k 6= j).
3 A stage of an SFBC-compliant election method will be referred
to as a Type 3 stage if at least one of the vectors defining a
victory condition is of Category 3, i.e. it satisfies the necessary
requirements for all possible boundaries.
This taxonomy is somewhat arbitrary, but the types are non-
overlapping and are related to key results proved below. In what
follows we will prove that Type 1 stages are heavily restricted and are
related to the ”positional methods” that Saari has studied extensively
[8]. We will then prove that Type 1b stages are also heavily restricted,
and are again related to positional methods. Type 2 stages are some-
what more varied and cannot be easily categorized, but we will prove
that they are nonetheless subject to significant restrictions. We will
also show that Type 2 stages occur in methods that have been studied
by others, if SFBC is relaxed to FBC [5, 6].
We will not devote much attention to Type 3 stages, as it is difficult
to conceive of a socially desirable election method that makes use of
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Type 3 stages. We are not aware of any methods that use Type 3
stages, and for the case of 3 candidates Type 3 stages turn out to be
rather tricky to construct in a manner that avoids multiple winners
(i.e. it is tricky to construct a Type 3 stage in which the conditions
for different candidates to win are mutually exclusive). The reason
for these complications in the case of 3 candidates is that if there
are 3 candidates and 3! = 6 preference orders (i.e. 6 components
to a normal vector) then 3 of those components must have the same
maximum value and 3 must have the same minimum value. This
tightly constrains the number of possible orientations for the vectors,
and so it turns out to be necessary to construct several conditions of
the form g1 ≤ (p,v) ≤ g2 (where g1 and g2 are constants) to ensure
that the victory regions thus defined are non-overlapping. When these
conditions are constructed and examined, it is difficult to interpret
them in terms of considerations usually used in the construction of
election method (e.g. majority support, point totals, or being one of
the top 2 candidates to make a runoff).
The constraints are less significant in the case of 4 or more can-
didates, but generally election method designers prefer methods that
can be stated in terms of simple criteria that can be just as easily
described regardless of the number of candidates. If the conditions
defining an election method cease to make sense when the number of
candidates is reduced to 3, the election method is unlikely to be of in-
terest. Moreover, even ignoring the issue of the number of candidates,
in elections using Type 3 stages it is possible that two voters with
the same favorite candidate may have completely opposite effects on
that candidate’s election prospects, because of the way that vectors in
Type 3 methods have both a maximum and a minimum component
corresponding to preferences with the same candidate in first place.
While it is often the case that casting a ballot with a particular prefer-
ence order (even a preference order listing one’s sincere favorite in first
place) will be sub-optimal (hence the interest in analyzing strategic
incentives), methods with Type 3 stages are more pathological than
most other methods (including methods that fail to satisfy FBC or
SFBC). For this reason, we will not analyze Type 3 stages in any de-
tail here, and the remainder of this work will focus on the other Types
of SFBC-compliant stages.
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7 Type 1 Stages
We will prove two main results here: First, we will prove that in order
to comply with SFBC a Type 1 stage must always return a result, i.e.
there can be no cases where a Type 1 method fails to return a result
because the conditions checked indicate that c1 beats c2 ((p,N12) >
0), c2 beats c3 ((p,N23) > 0), and c3 beats c1 ((p,N31) > 0). Such
failures to return a result are related to the familiar cyclic paradox
described by Condorcet[8]. Second, we will prove that methods of
that sort are point systems, in which candidates are assigned points
according to the ranks given by voters, and the candidate with the
most points wins.
7.1 Type 1 Stages and Paradoxes
We will begin by supposing that some stage of an election method,
numbered s in the sequence of stages, is a Type 1 stage, and we will
assume that this stage does not always return a result. If the vectors
normal to the boundaries defined in stage s are denoted Nsij , then
we can find a cyclic region of the unit simplex where (p,Ns12) < 0,
(p,Ns23) < 0, and (p,N
s
31) < 0. In this case, we need to check the sub-
sequent stage s+1. We will make no assumptions about whether stage
s+1 is of Type 1 or some other type. We will suppose, without loss of
generality, that stage s+1 selects candidate c3 as the winner, implying
that (p,Ns+1
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) > 0 and (p,Ns+1
31
) > 0. As long as one of the vectors
Ns12, N
s
23, and N
s
31 cannot be written as a linear combination of the
other two (a condition assured by our assumption that (p,Ns12) < 0,
(p,Ns23) < 0, and (p,N
s
31) < 0), it is possible to find a point where
the boundaries defined in stage s intersect. Our neutrality criterion
then assures that it is possible for this intersection to coincide with a
region of profile space where stage s+ 1 selects candidate c3.
Now consider the hypersurface consisting of the intersection of the
boundaries defined by the normal vectors Ns12, N
s
23, and N
s
31. We
specifically consider a portion of this hypersurface lying in a region
where stage s+1 selects candidate c3. (Below we will address the issue
of whether this intersection hypersurface lies inside the unit simplex.)
Assume initially that the profile vector is on the hypersurface defined
by the intersection of those boundaries. We can then displace the
profile vector slightly away from that intersection, so that we are in
a region where stage s selects candidate c1. Subsequently, we can
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change p slightly so that it crosses the 1−2 boundary defined in stage
s (without crossing the 2− 3 boundary! ) and we now have a situation
in which stage s yields no winner and so c3 wins. However, this is
a violation of SFBC, because the outcome changed from c1 to c3 by
crossing a boundary that does not satisfy necessary conditions for the
1− 3 boundary in SFBC-compliant methods.
In order to prove that this is a violation of SFBC, however, we
must address whether this intersection of planes occurred within the
unit simplex (i.e. did it occur for a valid profile?). A paradox that
only occurs when the profile vector p is outside the unit simplex (e.g.
some components of p are negative) is of no consequence for election
methods, since we cannot have a negative number of voters submitting
a ballot of a particular type. We will address this by considering what
happens when the normal vectors are changed in a way that shifts the
intersection out of the unit simplex.
Suppose initially that the boundaries all meet in the center of the
simplex at the point I/d discussed above. Our analysis above, in which
we displace the profile slightly from the intersection, clearly applies.
Suppose that we then start shifting boundaries around by changing the
right-hand side of each condition, so that the victory condition is now
(p,Nsij) > δ
s
ij . This will move each boundary around in a direction
parallel to its normal vector. However, we have seen previously that
changing the normal vector another vector proportional to I. Adding
to a normal some vector proportional to I does not affect compliance
with SFBC, because all of the elements of a normal vector change by
the same amount, so our conditions regarding maximum and minimum
elements are still met. We also change the profile so p so that its
position relative to the intersection is unchanged.
Even if we can translate the cyclic region entirely outside the unit
simplex, however, there is a second cyclic region, that intersects the
original cyclic region only along a surface of dimension 2 less than
the dimension of the boundary. This second cyclic region cannot be
reached by crossing only a single boundary, as it involves a different
intransitive relationship, one in which each pairwise comparison has
been reversed. Translating the first cyclic region outside the simplex
does not translate the second cyclic region outside, and because the
cyclic regions extend infinitely far out from their intersection point, it
is impossible to translate both regions outside of the simplex.
It therefore follows that SFBC violations are inevitable if a con-
dition (p,Nsij) < 0 (note the ”less than” symbol in the inequality)
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causes a stage to return no winner in a case where none of the pre-
vious stages of the method returned a winner, and the normal vector
Nij only meets the requirements for a single type of boundary in an
SFBC-compliant method, i.e. it is a Category 1 normal vector. This
gives us the following theorem:
Theorem 5 In a voting method that complies with SFBC, if one of
the normal vectors defining an inequality only satisfies the require-
ments for a single boundary, non-satisfaction of that inequality cannot
cause the stage to return no winner (unless there is a tie and none of
the subsequent stages return a winner).
This may seem like a surprising result, because if a stage contains
an inequality then there should be cases where that inequality is not
satisfied; otherwise there would be no reason to include that inequal-
ity. However, the non-satisfaction of an inequality need not cause the
entire stage to return no winner. It could be that non-satisfaction of
a particular inequality just means that the stage returns some other
winner. Suppose we take a particular victory condition in a stage and
examine the vectors defining the associated inequalities. Normal vec-
tors can be sorted into the three categories (enumerated at the end of
Section 6.1, depending on whether they satisfy the requirements for
only a single boundary (category 1) while other vectors may satisfy
the requirements for multiple boundaries (categories 2 and 3, depend-
ing on how many requirements are satisfied). Theorem 5 tells us that
if we examine all of the possible victory conditions for the various
candidates in a given stage, in at least one of those conditions all of
the inequalities involving vectors of the first category will be satis-
fied. Whether or not the stage returns a winner then depends on the
satisfaction of inequalities involving vectors of the second and third
categories.
One consequence of Theorem 5 is that if all of the vectors defining
a stage of conditions are of the first category (i.e. each vector only
satisfies the requirements for a single boundary in an SFBC-compliant
method), then there can be no case where the non-satisfaction of any
of the inequalities in that stage causes the stage to return no winner.
This leads to the following Theorem:
Theorem 6 If an SFBC-compliant election method includes a Type
1 stage, that stage must be the last stage of the method.
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7.2 Type 1 stages must return winners
Proving that a Type 1 stage of an election method must be the final
stage does not address the issue of whether a type 1 stage must have
a winner. One could consider the possibility of an election method in
which the final stage is a Type 1 stage that only gives paradoxes (no
winner) in situations where some previous stage has already yielded
a winner. We will now prove that such paradoxes lead to violations
of the SFBC, because constructing a method to avoid such paradoxes
imposes requirements on the earlier stages that are incompatible with
the SFBC.
Suppose that stage s of an SFBC-compliant method is of Type
1. Theorem 6 says that it must be the last stage of the election
method. Stage s is only utilized if all of the previous stages returned
no winner. A necessary condition for a previous stage to return no
winner is for a number of inequalities (involving vectors of the second
or third categories defined above) to be unsatisfied. We could therefore
generate a number of new stages that involve all of the conditions and
inequalities in s, augmented with inequalities indicating that other
stages returned no winners. Those inequalities would involve vectors
of the second and third categories, so these new new stages will be
Type 1b or Type 3.
There would be a great number of possible ways to reach stage
s (depending on which inequalities were unsatisfied in the previous
stages) so there would be a great many new stages formed by aug-
menting s. However, these new stages could be inserted anywhere in
our specification of the procedure without changing the election result.
We could thus place one of these augmented stages at the beginning
of the procedure.
If there are cases where stage s has a paradox like that of Condorcet
(i.e. (p,N12) < 0, (p,N23) < 0, and (p,N31) < 0) then there will
be cases where the first stage of the election method fails to return a
winner because of an unsatisfied inequality involving a vector of the
first category. According to Theorem 6, this leads to a violation of
SFBC. This leads to the following Theorem:
Theorem 7 A Type 1 stage in an election method satisfying SFBC
must always return a winner (except in the case of ties). There can be
no Condorcet-type paradoxes in a Type 1 stage of an election method
satisfying SFBC.
Finally, we can show that the SFBC imposes an additional con-
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straint on Type 1 stages. One could suppose that a Type 1 stage
s sometimes returns multiple winners (i.e. conditions for different
candidates to win are not mutually exclusive) but that these mul-
tiple victories only happen in situations where a previous stage has
returned a winner, avoiding the difficulty of multiple winners. We will
use reasoning analogous to that of Theorem 7 to show that a Type 1
stage must always return a unique winner (except in the case of ties,
which are a lower-dimensional subset of the unit simplex).
Suppose that we generate new stages by augmenting the conditions
of stage s with linear inequalities that are satisfied when other stages
return no winners. The inequalities added to the augmented stages
will again involve vectors of the second or third categories, so the aug-
mented stages are Type 1b or Type 3. There will again be a great
number of augmented stages, reflecting the different ways that stages
prior to s could fail to return a winner. However, we must also aug-
ment the conditions of stage s with additional inequalities specifying
that none of the other candidates win in stage s. These inequalities
can be obtained by taking inequalities from other conditions of stage
s and multiplying the vectors by −1. The non-satisfaction of one of
these inequalities (involving normal vectors of Category 1) will cause
the stage to return no winner, in violation of Theorem 5. This gives
our final theorem of this section:
Theorem 8 A stage of Type 1 in an election method satisfying SFBC
must always return a unique winner, except in the case of ties.
7.3 Generators of Type 1 Stages must not pro-
duce paradoxes
We will prove this result by constructing stages that have multiple gen-
erators, some of them with paradoxes and showing that they lead to
problems that can only be solved by introducing an additional single-
generator rule that decides the outcome in all cases. A generator
defines a series of relationships (possibly intransitive) between candi-
dates of the form ci beats cj . Suppose that a method has at least
2 generators, and we call 2 of these A and B. We have 3 possibil-
ities: Both generators always generate transitive relations, both can
generate intransitive relations, and one always generates a transitive
relation while the other can generate an intransitive relation. Addi-
tionally, we consider the possibility that the stage has more than one
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condition for each candidate to win, as well as the possibility that the
stage has exactly one condition for each candidate to win.
Now consider stages in which each condition has inequalities pro-
duced from different generators. Suppose that all of the conditions for
c1, c2, and c3 to win have inequalities of the form (p,N
A
12), (p,N
A
23),
and (p,NA31), and each is supplemented by an inequality generated
from B. (These inequalities might also be supplemented by inequali-
ties from other generators, but in what follows we get sufficient con-
ditions on A and B.) If A sometimes gives a paradox then this stage
can return no winner. It therefore follows that A must always return
a winner, and the only candidate who can win this stage is the can-
didate elected according to A. The inequalities generated by B are
either superfluous or else lead to paradoxes.
We are left with the possibility of producing a Type 1 stage by com-
bining inequalities from different generators in each condition. Con-
sidering only swaps of candidates c1, c2, and c3, we get 6 possible
conditions from A and B. We list the associated sets of inequalities
below:
Condition 1.1 Condition 2.1 Condition 3.1
(p,NA12) > 0 (p,N
A
23) > 0 (p,N
A
31) > 0
(p,NB13) > 0 (p,N
B
21) > 0 (p,N
B
32) > 0
Condition 1.2 Condition 2.2 Condition 3.2
(p,NB12) > 0 (p,N
B
23) > 0 (p,N
B
31) > 0
(p,NA13) > 0 (p,N
A
21) > 0 (p,N
A
32) > 0
Suppose, without loss of generality, that A generates a transitive re-
lationship c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 and B generates an intransitive relationship
c1 ≻ c2, c2 ≻ c3, and c3 ≻ c1.
1 The stage described above gives:
Condition 1.1 Condition 2.1 Condition 3.1
c1 ≻ c2 c2 ≻ c3 c3 ≺ c1
c1 ≺ c3 c2 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ c2
Condition 1.2 Condition 2.2 Condition 3.2
c1 ≻ c2 c2 ≻ c3 c3 ≻ c1
c1 ≻ c3 c2 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ c2
In this case, c1 satisfies Condition 1.2 and the inequalities generated
by B are thus superfluous. If the cycle generated by B were reversed,
c1 would still win, but by Condition 1.l.
Finally, suppose that A and B give opposite paradoxes with all
1We are using the notation ci ≻ cj and cj ≺ ci to mean “ci is preferred to cj”. The
notation ci ∼ cj will mean that neither candidate is preferred to the other.
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relationships reversed. We get the following table of outcomes:
Condition 1.1 Condition 2.1 Condition 3.1
c1 ≻ c2 c2 ≻ c3 c3 ≻ c1
c1 ≻ c3 c2 ≻ c1 c3 ≻ c2
Condition 1.2 Condition 2.2 Condition 3.2
c1 ≺ c2 c2 ≺ c3 c3 ≺ c1
c1 ≺ c3 c2 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ c2
The only way to decide this contest is to introduce an additional gen-
erator C and augment the conditions with more inequalities. The
outcome is then decided by C in this case, and in order to avoid para-
doxes, C must also return the same winner as this stage would return
without C, in cases where A and B together return a unique winner.
It therefore follows that in all cases this stage must return the result
that C would return, and so ”A and B are superfluous.
We are therefore left to conclude that when constructing a Type
1 stage with multiple generators, none of the generators can give a
paradox.
7.4 Type 1 Stages are Point Systems
Given that a Type 1 stage must always return a unique winner (except
in the case of ties) and hence must always be the last stage in an
election method satisfying SFBC, and that the generators cannot give
rise to paradoxes, we now ask what sorts of election rules are defined
by generators of Type 1 stages. We will prove below that such election
rules are equivalent to point systems, in which a candidate receives
points based on the position assigned on a ballot, irrespective of how
other candidates are ranked on that ballot, a candidate’s points from
all of the ballots are summed, and the candidate with the most points
wins. When the election method requires voters to submit a complete
ranking of candidates, with all ranks used and no equal rankings,
these methods are commonly called ”positional methods” [8]. One
obvious SFBC-compliant election method is anti-plurality voting. Any
other positional methods that assigns equal (and maximum) points to
first and second choice candidates on a ballot would also comply with
SFBC, as there is no disincentive for a voter to list his or her sincere
favorite in first place: If there is a close race between two candidates,
and neither of those candidates is a voter’s favorite, that voter can list
his or her sincere favorite in first place and the more preferred of the
front-runners in second place, because the second place candidate on
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the ballot will receive the maximum point total.
However, positional methods are not the only possible Type 1
stages. In Section 2, we included in our analysis ballots in which some
positions may be left empty and other positions may be assigned to
multiple candidates, and we remarked that Approval Voting is one
such method. Approval Voting does not satisfy SFBC, because there
are times when a voter has an incentive to approve multiple candi-
dates, giving equal points to his or her favorite as well as a compro-
mise candidate. However, a modified form of Approval Voting, with
3 ranks on the ballot and equal points for the first and second places
would satisfy our phrasing of SFBC, albeit on a technicality. Likewise,
we could modify Range Voting[5, 6], an SFBC-compliant technique in
which voters assign points to candidates within some specified range
(e.g. 0 to 5). In a modified SFBC-compliant form of Range Voting,
there would be two top positions on the ballot, with equal points but
one would be recorded as a voter’s true favorite. This illustrates yet
again that while SFBC can be satisfied in principle, it is difficult to de-
sign an SFBC-compliant method that makes a meaningful distinction
between first and second place.
The fact that a Type 1 stage s must always return a winner means
that the stage will never give a paradox, which in turn implies that
there is always a transitive relationship among the candidates. If
(p,Ns12) = (p,N
s
23) = 0, i.e. ties between c1 and c2 as well as c2 and
c3, then (p,N
s
13) = 0, (i.e. there is also a tie between c1 and c3. More
generally, if (p,Ns12) = (p,N
s
23) = ... = (p,N
s
nc−1,nc
) = 0 implies that
all other inner products (p,Nsij) are also zero, then the nc(nc − 1)/2
normal vectors {N sij} are not linearly independent. This implies that
of all the normal vectors to the boundaries, at most nc−1 of them are
linearly independent. We can show that no fewer than nc − 1 normal
vectors are linearly independent by considering ties between c1 and
c2, c2 and c3, etc. all the way to cnc−2 and cnc−1. These conditions
will mean that many pairs of candidates are tied with each other (e.g.
c1 and cnc−1 are tied) but they do not guarantee a tie between cnc−1
and cnc .
Due to the Neutrality criterion, in a stage with exactly 1 victory
condition per candidate and nc− 1 inequalities per candidate, we also
have that each boundary normal Nsij must be unchanged by swaps of
any candidates other than ci and cj . It therefore follows that (p,N
s
ij)
depends only on how many voters listci and cj in each spot on the
ballot. We could therefore write (p,Nsij) = Ti − Tj where Ti and Tj
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are point totals assigned to each candidate according to how many
voters list that candidate in a particular spot on the ballot. There are
nc point totals to calculate, and if we calculate the differences between
all possible pairs of point totals we get nc − 1 linearly independent
quantities, which correspond to the nc−1 linearly independent normal
vectors that can be found.
Moreover, if a point system is to satisfy SFBC, it must award equal
points to a voter’s first and second choices, so that the voter can give
the maximum possible points to a contender in a close race without
having to demote his/her sincere favorite from the top place on the
ballot. However, as we have discussed above, this is only a technical
case of compliance with SFBC, since the method makes no practical
distinction between first and second place. Hence, Type 1 stages only
satisfy “Strong” FBC in a very weak sense.
The only remaining question to ask is whether we could use two
or more different Type 1 generators, each giving rise to a different
point system, to produce a Type 1 stage with multiple conditions for
a candidate to win. However, in that case, a condition would be a mix
of inequalities related to different point systems. In general, there will
be cases in which candidates c1 and c2 both beat c3 in two different
point systems generated by vectors A and B, but A selects c1 over
c2, while B selects c2 over c1. Using the same table of outcomes as
above, we get:
Condition 1.1 Condition 2.1 Condition 3.1
c1 ≻ c2 c2 ≻ c3 c3 ≺ c1
c1 ≻ c3 c2 ≻ c1 c3 ≺ c2
Condition 1.2 Condition 2.2 Condition 3.2
c1 ≺ c2 c2 ≻ c3 c3 ≺ c1
c1 ≻ c3 c2 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ c2
In this case, a third generator is needed to generate another point
system to decide between c1 and c2, and this third generator must,
as before, always give the same results as the method generated by
A and B, rendering those two generators redundant with the third
generator. We can thus conclude that a Type 1 stage can only have a
single generator, which generates a point system.
We therefore get this theorem, which is our primary result in this
paper:
Theorem 9 Any Type 1 stage that satisfies SFBC, Neutrality, Anonymity,
Linearity, No Turnout Quota, and Decisiveness is a point system in
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which candidates receive points based on how many voters list the can-
didate in each spot on the ballot and the candidate with the most points
wins. In these point systems, the candidates listed in the first and sec-
ond places on the ballot must receive equal points.
If the method requires a strict ranking (i.e. no ties and no unused
ballot spots) of all nc candidates, then the method is a Positional
Method of the sort studied by Saari.
8 Type 1b Stages
We now consider Type 1b stages. Although a stage of an SFBC-
compliant method can never fail to return a winner due to the non-
satisfaction of an inequality specified by a Type 1 vector, a Type 1
stage (based on a point system) could be augmented by additional
inequalities if these inequalities involve Type 2 vectors. Because the
underlying Type 1 stage would always return a winner, the only way
the stage would fail to return a winner is through the non-satisfaction
of an inequality specified by a Type 2 vector.
However, we must be careful here: Suppose that candidate c1 sat-
isfies all of the Type 2 inequalities required for victory, and all but one
of the Type 1 inequalities required for victory. The remaining inequal-
ity is not satisfied because the profile is on a boundary: (p,Ns12) = 0.
The transitivity of the relationships defined by the Type 1 inequalities
implies that c2 also satisfies all of the Type 1 inequalities required for
victory in stage s, except that (p,Ns21) = 0.
In this case, changing the profile to change the sign of (p,Ns12)
should change the outcome from c1 to c2 without requiring the use
of a subsequent stage of conditions. This only works if, whenever the
profile is on the 1−2 boundary defined by the Type 1 inequalities (i.e.
c1 and c2 have equal points), and c1 satisfies a Type 2 inequality, c2
also satisfies the analogous Type 2 inequality. Because the Type 1
inequalities are expressed in terms of point totals, the Type 2 inequal-
ities must then also be expressed in terms of point totals. In other
words, when c1 and c2 have equal points, and have more points than
any other candidate, both candidates must either satisfy the Type 2
inequalities or both candidates must not satisfy the Type 2 inequali-
ties.
It then follows that the Type 2 inequalities can only depend on
the total number of points that a candidate receives, rather than a
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comparison of the points received by 2 different candidates. In order
to satisfy the No Turnout Quota criterion, the criterion must be a
threshold of support points proportional to the number of voters par-
ticipating, rather than some fixed number of points independent of
the number of voters. We then get the following result:
Theorem 10 Any Type 1b stage that satisfies SFBC, Neutrality, Anonymity,
Linearity, No Turnout Quota, and Decisiveness is a point system in
which candidates receive points based on how many voters list the can-
didate in each spot on the ballot and the candidate with the most points
wins if the number of points received by that candidate exceeds a thresh-
old that is proportional to the number of voters. In these point systems,
the candidates listed in the first and second places on the ballot must
receive equal points.
Consider an example of a Type 1b voting rule that satisfies SFBC:
Voters rank candidates, and a candidate receives 1 point from each
voter who ranks that candidate in first or second place. If the points
received exceed a quota (e.g. at least 75% of the voters give that
candidate a point). Otherwise, the winner is the candidate ranked in
last place by the fewest voters.
Another example would be a method in which ballots have 4 places,
and the option to list no candidates in some of the places. The winner
is the candidate ranked in first or second place by the greatest num-
ber of voters, if that candidate is ranked in those places by a majority
of the voters. Otherwise, the candidate ranked in first, second, or
third place by the greatest number of voters is the winner. While this
method does not make a meaningful distinction between first and sec-
ond place, it does not obligate the voter to put a candidate in second
place. There will be situations in which a voter has a strategic incen-
tive to rank a candidate in second place (usually because his or her
favorite is not a contender, but some other less-preferred candidates
are contenders), but there will also be situations in which a voter has
no such incentive (usually because his or her favorite is a contender).
In the later case, the voter is able to make a meaningful distinction
between first place and the next most highly-ranked candidate on the
ballot.
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9 Type 2 Stages
General results are harder to find for Type 2 stages, in which all
of the inequalities are defined by Type 2 vectors, i.e. the vectors
defining the conditions for candidate c1 to win satisfy the conditions
for the normals to the 1− 2, 2− 3, etc. boundaries. However, we can
show that if we restrict our attention to 3-candidate elections in which
voters must submit strict and complete rankings (i.e. all candidates
are ranked and no two candidates are ranked equal to each other)
then such methods must be non-monotonic. We will use the following
definition of monotonicity, taken from Saari [8]:
Definition 7 A voting method is monotonic if when cj is chosen
with some profile p, and the only voters to change preferences change
them to give cj a higher ranking (while preserving the relative rankings
of all other candidates) then cj is still elected with the new profile p
′.
Let us examine the implications of this requirement for a normal
vector v that satisfies the requirements of SFBC for N1,2 and N1,3
(i.e. v1 is a Type 2 vector). Suppose that candidate c3 is elected
and a voter has submitted a ballot with the preference c1 ≻ c2 ≻
c3. If that voter changes his ballot to read c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 then c3
should still win rather than c1. This implies that the component of
v1 corresponding to c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 is greater than or equal to the
component corresponding to c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2. However, this same vector
also satisfies the conditions for the 1− 2 boundary. Suppose that we
now have a situation where c2 wins (under the same conditions, i.e.
the outcome is determined by the sign of the inner product (p,v1))
and a voter then changes his ballot from reading c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 to
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3. In this case, c2 should still win rather than c1, and so
the component of v1 corresponding to c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 should be greater
than or equal to the component corresponding to c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2. We
therefore conclude that the components corresponding to c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3
and c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 must be equal.
SFBC also implies that these components must be the largest com-
ponents of the vector, so that voters whose favorite is c1 do not have
to list their favorite below first place in order to submit a ballot that
gives c1 the maximum benefit. For simplicity, we will assume that
these components are both +1. Furthermore, SFBC implies that 2
other components must also be equal to +1, with one of those com-
ponents corresponding to a ballot that lists c2 in first place, and the
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Table 1: Basis for SFBC-compliant methods with 3 candidates
Preference vector
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
other corresponding to a ballot that lists c3 in first place. We will con-
sider the implications of monotonicity to determine which components
should be +1.
Suppose that c1 wins in a situation where the outcome is deter-
mined by the sign of the inner product (p,v1). If a voter changes his
or her ballot from c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 to c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3, the candidate c1 should
still win, implying that the component corresponding to c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3
must be larger than the component corresponding to c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1,
and hence must be equal to +1. A similar analysis implies that the
component corresponding to c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 must also be +1. The other
components, corresponding to c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 and c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 must be
equal to some negative number −m. We hence see that in the case of
SFBC-compliant and monotonic election methods with only 3 candi-
dates and strict rankings, all of the Type 2 normal vectors are of the
form:
v1 = (+1,+1,+1,−m,−m,+1) (6)
We are working in the basis defined by Saari [8]:
A similar form can be obtained for a Type 2 vector v2 or v3
that expresses a condition for c2 or c3 to win. This sort of condition
could be expressed as “c1 wins if the number of voters listing c1 in
first or second place is greater than m times the number of voters
listing c1 in last place.” It thus follows that if an SFBC-compliant
method is monotonic, and if there are only 3 candidates and the ballots
require voters to give complete rankings of the candidates without
equal rankings (in any position) then there is only one possible form
for a Type 2 condition.
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The problem is that in this case the Type 2 conditions for c1 to
win and for c2 to win are not mutually exclusive. This is easy to show
by example. Suppose that all of the voters list c3 in last place. It then
follows that the number of voters listing c1 in first or second place is
greater than m times the number listing c1 in last place (since that
number is zero), and the same holds true for the number listing c2
in first or second place. This Type 2 stage can therefore not decide
between c1 and c2, violating our decisiveness condition. We therefore
get the following result:
Theorem 11 If an SFBC-compliant method is monotonic and satis-
fies Anonymity, Neutrality, Linearity, Decisiveness, and No Turnout
Quota, it cannot have a Type 2 stage if there are 3 candidates and the
ballots require voters to rank all candidates without any equal rankings.
10 Ties and SFBC
So far, we have largely neglected ties except to note their existence and
equate them to boundaries between victory regions in profile space.
However, we have not considered the rules used to break ties. Inter-
estingly, in the case of tie-breaking procedures, it is possible to satisfy
Strong FBC rather than just a weak form. Suppose that we have
some SFBC-compliant method, and we supplement it with a rule that
when there is a 2-way tie (i.e. two boundaries intersect) the winner is
whichever of the 2 candidates is ranked above the other by the most
voters. There is no incentive to list another candidate ahead of one’s
favorite in this tie-breaking procedure, and there is no incentive to list
another candidate ahead of one’s favorite in any other part of the vot-
ing procedure (due to SFBC-compliance). However, the tie-breaking
procedure truly satisfies SFBC in a strong sense. Notably, pairwise
comparisons work in ties, but not in general multi-candidate elections,
because ties are 2-way elections, whereas a general multi-candidate
election is susceptible to the Condorect paradox. Unfortunately, this
stronger form of compliance with SFBC only happens in an exceed-
ingly rare case.
11 FBC vs. SFBC
Interestingly, while we can show that election methods are highly re-
stricted if we insist that no voter ever have an incentive to rank an-
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other candidate equal to his or her sincere favorite, a much wider
variety of election methods are possible if we relax SFBC to FBC,
and consider methods in which a voter sometimes has an incentive to
rank another candidate equal to his or her sincere favorite, but never
has an incentive to rank another candidate above his or her sincere
favorite. Interestingly, some of these methods actually make meaning-
ful distinctions between first and second place, unlike methods that
satisfy our very strict formulation of SFBC as discussed above.
We will illustrate this point with three examples:
11.1 Range Voting
In Range Voting[5, 6], each voter assigns each candidate points on
some scale (typically 0 to some upper bound), and the candidate with
the most points wins. In the case where the upper bound is 1, Range
Voting is equivalent to Approval Voting. A voter may have an in-
centive to assign the maximum score to some candidate other than
his or her sincere favorite (if that candidate is in a close race with a
less-preferred candidate) but there is never a disincentive to give the
top score to the sincere first choice. This is a point system, just like
the Type 1 SFBC-compliant methods, and is a Type 1 FBC-compliant
method.
11.2 Majority Choice Approval
A very simple example of a Type 1b FBC-compliant method is Major-
ity Choice Approval Voting. In this simple method, a voter can rate
each candidate as “Preferred”, “Approved”, or “Disapproved.” The
candidate who is rated “Preferred” by the greatest number of voters
wins, provided that he or she is rated thus by a majority of voters.
Otherwise, the candidate with the greatest combined “Preferred” and
“Approved” ratings wins. The comparisons of vote totals are all ex-
pressed by Type 1 vectors, and the requirement that the total exceed
a majority threshold is expressed by a Type 2 vector, giving a Type
1b method.
11.3 Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval
Another FBC-compliant method is Majority Defeat Disqualification
Approval (MDDA), first studied by Kevin Venzke[5, 6]. In MDDA
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Table 2: Ballot counts being compared to determine if c1 dominates c2.
Does not prefer c2 to c1 Prefers c2 to c1
(vector component = +1) (vector component = −1)
c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c3
c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1
c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1
c1 ≻ c2 ∼ c3 c2 ≻ c1 ∼ c3
c1 ∼ c3 ≻ c2 c2 ∼ c3 ≻ c1
c1 ∼ c2 ≻ c3
c3 ≻ c1 ∼ c2
and related methods, voters rank as many candidates as they wish,
with equal rankings allowed; all unranked candidates are treated as
being ranked equal to each other in last place. All ranked candidates
are said to be approved. A candidate ci is said to be dominated by a
candidate cj if a majority of voters rank cj above ci. If one candidate
dominates all other candidates, that candidate wins. Because equal
rankings are allowed, it is possible that there will be no majority
favoring ci over cj and no majority favoring cj over ci, in which case
neither candidate is dominated by the other. If there are multiple un-
dominated candidates, or no un-dominated candidates, some other
method must be used.
In MDDA and related methods based on the concept of majority
dominance, the outcome is determined by whether or not a candidate
is dominated by another candidate. Let us define a vector d12 such
that (p,d12) > 0 if c1 is not dominated by c2. The elements of the
d12 are summarized in Table 2.
For each candidate, there is at least one preference that corre-
sponds to a maximum (largest positive) element (+1) of d12. There
are also minimum (largest negative) elements corresponding to pref-
erences that list c2 and c3 in first place. This is a type 2 vector. For
a stage in which the outcome is determined only by comparing can-
didates and eliminating dominated candidates, all of the vectors are
Type 2, and we thus see that a wider range of Type 2 methods are
possible if we relax SFBC to FBC.
If there is more than 1 undominated candidate, the outcome is
decided by a stage that elects the undominated candidate ranked last
by the fewest people. In this case, Type 2 vectors (to determine who is
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not dominated) are combined with Type 1 vectors (comparing points
based on last place rankings) to give a Type 1b stage.
12 Least Favorite Promotion
Interestingly, we can formulate an analogous criterion for voters who
are less interested in supporting their favorite and more interested in
avoiding the accidental election of their least favorite due to strategic
manipulations. This fear may be well-warranted in some cases: In a
3-candidate election with an SFBC-compliant method, promoting the
least favorite to second place may be a viable strategy for electing
the voter’s favorite over his or her second choice, but such strategies
always come at a risk.
If we were to pursue the same approach as used above for identi-
fying SFBC-compliant methods, and call the new criterion “Least Fa-
vorite Promotion”, we would find that a major portion of the methods
are point systems of some sort or another. Some types of point sys-
tems (e.g. Range Voting, Approval Voting, positional methods that
give equal points to first and second choices and zero points to last and
second-last choices) would satisfy both SFBC and also Least Favorite
Promotion.
13 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have shown that the Strong Favorite Betrayal Cri-
terion is exceedingly difficult to satisfy. Two of the four geometri-
cal categories of methods are restricted to point systems. The Type
2 methods have more variety, but the most interesting methods are
only found if SFBC is relaxed to allow for the possibility of sometimes
ranking another candidate equal to one’s favorite, e.g. Majority De-
feat Disqualification Approval. When SFBC is replaced with FBC,
the resulting methods actually make meaningful distinctions between
first and second place, satisfying the “spirit” but not the “letter” of
SFBC. The most significant practical consequence of these results is
that election reformers who want to be free from disincentives against
supporting their sincere favorite above all others must accept systems
in which voters sometimes rank another candidate equal to their fa-
vorite (either explicitly, in FBC, or implicitly in point systems that
give equal points to first and second place).
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